

## Contemporary Challenges and Taliban Regime in Afghanistan

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### ABSTRACT

*Interethnic strife in Afghanistan has a long and storied history, often following tribal boundaries. Since the US pulled out of Afghanistan after signing a peace accord, the country has been left with a political and social void, giving various centrifugal forces the chance to wreak havoc on an already precarious situation. There are several strategic and political ramifications of the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan, according to political observers, but the country's ethnic variety is often overlooked. This research looks at the historical tribal rivalries in Afghanistan, their geographical effects, and the outlook for the future of the country. This research attempts to establish a link between ethnic strife and the humanitarian situation plaguing Kabul as it chronically follows its upward trajectory. The theory of conflict developed by Max Weber provides the theoretical foundation for a deeper comprehension of both internal and external conflicts. Afghanistan's economic crises, the amassing of rough power in the country, the incompetence of the TTA in managing that power, and the country's political isolation all create fertile ground for a civil war or Sunni-Shia conflict backed by international and regional jihadist groups. If South Asia is to be spared from becoming the next cauldron for ethnic and sectarian strife, a thorough examination of the origins, historical manifestations, and potential futures of internal conflict in the region is essential.*

### KEYWORDS

Afghanistan, ethnic strife, humanitarian crisis, inside out strategy.

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### INTRODUCTION

President George W. Bush declared a new expedition, branded a war on terror, against Afghanistan after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He assures us that the United States, with the help of other international powers, will do all it takes to vanquish its enemies. The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to and tolerance of its chosen path. On a few occasions, he has stated (Bush, 2001) that the United States will ultimately prevail in the war, despite its length.

President Biden hastily pulled out American soldiers from Afghanistan on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks (Liptak, 2021). This ends the war on terror, which has lasted for twenty years. It's frustrating for the United States' NATO allies that he doesn't even bother to ask for their input. Although the conflict has been going on for twenty years, whether or not the outcome was a victory is still debatable as of 2020 (Shivaram & Campbell, 2021).

According to the Afghan military and diplomats, the suddenness of the US pullout has caused concern within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) relies on US intelligence, which highlights the lopsided nature of the relationship between the two parties involved in the battle. However, the United States does not take into account its NATO partners when delegating responsibility for Afghanistan's nation-state construction and economic progress (Felbab-Brown, 2021).

- The Kabul administration has seen a decline in its influence and legitimacy over the past few years as a result of US peace talks with the Taliban. Afghanistan's central government has benefited greatly from the international community's generous financial and military aid. In comparison to its foes, the Taliban, the government's institutes have provided public services including as education, healthcare, and security. The fact that half of Afghanistan's state budget comes from overseas aid is cited as the primary cause by the Global War on Terror Index and the Global Security Index in 2020. Ninety percent of Afghanistan's budget goes toward building up the country's armed forces and police forces, thanks to funding from international countries (Byrd & Farahi, 2018). Central and regional stakeholders have been thrown off balance due to a lack of money for the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Shivaram & Campbell, 2021; Esfandiari & Ahmadi, 2021).



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## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Afghanistan is completely surrounded by hostile terrain, including mountains, deserts, and the battlegrounds of rivaling imperial powers. The British have extended their geopolitical battles in India to the eastern edge of Afghanistan, while the Russians have established their frontiers in the north. After encountering too much resistance, non-Muslim powers have always shaped Afghanistan's national character. Countries including China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and India surround this region.

According to Motlagh (2021), the United Kingdom ruled Afghanistan between the years 1747 and 1973. Various Pashtun groups ruled as monarchs. Foreign invaders and violent battles plagued Afghanistan for centuries; the country was ravaged by the Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1860 and the Afghan Civil War in 1820. British forces have made three separate attempts to take Afghanistan in an effort to expand their sphere of influence beyond India and contain any further Russian expansion. In 1900, Afghans were exposed to a third traumatic Anglo-Afghan War warfare. In 1940, during the Soviet-Afghan war, King Zahir Shah was deposed and the kingdom was exposed to Soviet communist doctrine. In 1980, Islamic militants fought the Soviet Union's occupation.

On August 19th, 1919, Afghanistan declared its independence from the British. Historians believe that colonial powers, especially Tsarist Russia, intended to establish a buffer state in the form of a poor, landlocked nation. There has never been a stable, appropriate, or effective political system in the country's history. Afghanistan is no stranger to uprisings and wars. According to Ostrom's "An Introduction to IAD and the language of the Ostrom Workshop: A simple guide to a complex framework," the last monarch of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973 by his cousin, Afghan commander Daud Shah. A major factor in the downfall of powerful governments was familial conflict. In concert with the People's Democratic Party (PDP), he proclaimed a parliamentary system. Soviet-backed factions are prone to power struggles, and Daud Shah has recently cracked down on the PDP. In retaliation, the PDP had communists kill Daud Shah and his family in 1978.

According to a comment from Shahrani (2013)'s "Approaching Study of Political Culture in Afghanistan with Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) & Social-Ecological Systems (SES) Frameworks," the Soviet Union imposed a communist system on Afghanistan. After the deadly struggle in Afghanistan shifted, Nur Muhammad Tarakai took control. Most religious organizations have opposed efforts to boost communist groupings. There were internal tensions that led to the 1979 death of the Nur Tarakai. Hafizullah Amin, once his VP, is now the acting PM. In that same year, Amin enlisted in the American army. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent death of Amin, leadership was handed to Babrak Karmal. In response to the Soviet invasion, the religious sect known as the Mujahidin launched an insurgency that lasted for ten years.

In an attempt to undermine Soviet influence, the United States engaged in a geopolitical conflict. It exacted its revenge for defeat in the Vietnam War by providing armored vehicles for use in an offensive in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, where tribal and ethnic identities are deeply ingrained, a centralized power structure was deemed socially and culturally unsuitable only around the end of the eighteenth century (Shahrani, 2013). Millions upon millions of cash were funneled to them covertly by the United States via the Islamic world. Costs for the CIA's Afghan campaign were \$3 million through 1981, but with Saudi funding, that number ballooned to \$20 million by 1984. With U.S. support in the form of weapons and funding, Mujahideen fighters slaughtered thousands of Soviet troops.

Many people, including the world's wealthiest man, Osama bin Laden, have volunteered to fight alongside the Mujahidin in this insurrection. From 1981 to 1982, he provided material and financial support for the Afghan Mujahidin. Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai, the prime minister of Afghanistan from 1995 to 1996, said that Osama bin Laden had amassed a fortune for the country's destitute, widows, and orphans. The Afghan government avoided combat with him because he established a mountain training ground for Mujahidin. His position in Afghanistan was known to the United States, but he was not viewed as a global danger outside the Soviet Union.

US intelligence officer Michael Scheuer (2011) claims that Osama was viewed as a hero among the Afghan Arabs he led in their fight against Soviet forces. As a result of the war, three million Afghans were forced to seek asylum in neighboring Pakistan. In his paper "The Stinger missile and US intervention in Afghanistan," Kuperman (1999) explains that Saudi Arabia supported Madrassas to educate Afghan youngsters, but these schools actually served as training grounds for the Mujahidin. The Soviet Union abruptly shifted its strategy, killing thousands of Afghan civilians and Mujahideen in airstrikes. The United States supplied them with stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet planes. In 1989, President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union declared the end of military involvement in the conflict. Communist ideology and a weak economy contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union Federation. Ten years of war have cost Afghanistan 15 million civilian lives and a great deal of cultural and social heritage.

According to the essay "Osama Bin Laden" by Scheuer (2011), bin Laden fled back to Saudi Arabia just as a fresh civil war broke out in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet-Afghan struggle. For the next three years, Afghanistan was led by communist Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai. It was a struggle for control of Kabul that sparked the civil war. The Mujahidin split into factions backed by competing global powers as a result of internal strife. Former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-2001) established the 'Jamiat-e-Islami' movement with Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud at

the helm as Afghanistan's interim defense minister. The second was the Hezb-e-Islami, or "Party of Islam," which was established in 1976 by the former prime minister of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. They were at odds with one another and fought together to overthrow Najeeb's regime.

Communal leader Abdul Rashid Dostum defected to the Taliban in 1992 together with his Uzbek party Junbish-e-Milli, following a rebellion against Prime Minister Najeeb. Dostum and Massoud conquered Bagram Air Base with the help of other Northern Alliance minority parties. Najeeb had to deal with strife among his own security personnel, and they eventually rebelled against him. Following Najeeb's departure to the Soviet Union, the armed forces extended an invitation to Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul to take over control in Afghanistan. He turned down the offer and stationed his military in Northern Afghanistan until all parties to the Afghan war had agreed on a diplomatic settlement. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, on the other hand, relocated to Kabul and flatly rejected Massoud's offer of a negotiated political compromise. Fighting on the battlefield and political negotiations occurred simultaneously. On page 221 (Allan, 2013).

Peshawar accord (1992) stipulated that Sibghatullah Mojaddedi would preside over an interim government in Afghanistan from April 28 until June 28. The 'Jamiat-e-Islami' leader Burhanuddin Rabbani took over as interim president until 28 October 1992. They settled on a course of action whereby Parliament would write a temporary constitution to establish a caretaker administration for the next 18 months prior to general elections. Gulbuddin refused to serve as prime minister in any coalition administration and instead launched rockets at Kabul, escalating the conflict. Rashid Dostum joined the ranks of his supporters. Kabul was on fire, thousands of Afghans had been displaced both inside and outside the country, and Mujahidin factions were marching on the city. To be specific, (Kuperman, 1999).

In their 2019 essay "Consequences of a Precipitous US Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Dobbins et al. emphasize that Bin Laden was the impetus for the United States to become involved in the hostilities in Afghanistan. Bin Laden's alleged involvement in the bombings was quickly dismissed by the Taliban. Since he was not allowed to leave Afghanistan without Mullah Omer's approval, he knew the guy could not launch an attack elsewhere. According to "Afghanistan: What the Rise of the Taliban Means for Pakistan" by Landale (2021) on BBC News, the Saudi government requested that Bin Laden be handed over to it. Mullah Omer, however, was unconvinced, noting that the Gotham Buddha monument was destroyed after they began following the United States, and that the world's other superpowers then abandoned the Taliban.

Initially a local power struggle in Kabul, the war on terror has since spread around the globe. Massoud, who was traveling around the world warning of the dangers of Al Qaeda and the Taliban working together, said that this battle was not just an internal one for Afghanistan. A bomb hidden in a camera went off in Panjshir, killing him on September 9. After the death of Massoud, 9/11 occurred just two days later. The United States urged Mullah Omer to turn over Bin Laden, but he refused to believe that Bin Laden was responsible for the attacks' planning. At long last, on October 1, 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan in retaliation. If Afghanistan could stabilize or establish peace and practice free will on humanitarian grounds after twenty years of brutal conflict was a legitimate concern (Khanzada, 2021).

## **INSIDE OUT STRATEGY**

Invaders were never able to establish themselves in Afghanistan for very long. After a brutal battle from 2001 to 2021, the United States has finally left Afghanistan. However, the country is now in a contentious state. This time, the United States attempted to engage with the Taliban in Afghanistan without including Ashraf Ghani's government. In Afghanistan, India is in charge of having US contractors train the army (Esfandiari & Ahmadi, 2021). Afghan forces were given unquestioning faith by the Afghan government, the United States, NATO countries, and the Indians. An ineffective national defense force was a major factor in the repeated invasions of Afghanistan. Afghan government and population fears of being abandoned contributed to the escalation of violence (Nagesh, 2021).

In 2014, the United States installed a coalition government in Afghanistan consisting of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara factions following disputed elections. The Afghan people and militant groups like the Taliban rejected the illegitimate government. According to "Resources over Reform in Afghanistan: How Changes in the Political Economy are Reshaping Local Politics," written by Anna Larson and Noah Coburn, an unconstitutional administration was formed after the disputed elections of 2014. Long discussions between several tribes would eventually allow for the establishment of the compromised administration. The protracted recount process resulted in the election of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, who led a corrupt and insecure government that wreaked havoc on Afghanistan's economy and political stability.

It was expected that the internationally recognized government in Afghanistan would provide a safe environment for international aid workers to do their jobs and improve the lives of the Afghan people. When genuine government and foreign soldiers were present, the development process resumed. As of August 15, 2021, when the National Defense and Security Forces capitulated to the Taliban, the country's \$65 billion investment in security, education, and reconstruction had been for naught. There are encouraging trends in areas like as women's emancipation, economic diversity, media advancement, and health care thanks to global support.

In an effort to prevent civil war, the United States and its allies ultimately failed. The already vulnerable Afghan population was further harmed as internal and external conflicts escalated. The same thing happened again in July of 2019 when Ashraf

Ghani was sworn in as president of Afghanistan. For reasons of national security, the Afghan people were prevented from casting ballots. Sociological studies of war and terrorism (2016) and Larson and Coburn (2016) both point to the influence of economic incentive, the dominance of power groups, and tribal strife in these elections. A probe into political engineering is not something that the opposition candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, can rely on. According to Dobbins, Campbell, Mann, and Miller (2019), page 8, the climate of the US and its allies' troop withdrawal made it impossible to maintain support for the Afghan government.

## **HUMANITARIAN CRISIS**

The globe is now faced with a difficulty as a result of the humanitarian catastrophe. There has been a breaking point reached in Afghanistan's humanitarian disaster. It's things like persistent poverty, food insecurity, dried up reservoirs, a shoddy health care system, the Covid-19 pandemic, tribal feuds, classism, an unknowable future, mounting psychological scars from war, minority fears, terrorist organizations, and the deaths of loved ones. Concurrently, the Afghan government is attempting to establish its legitimacy in light of its international recognition.

To improve its standing at the United Nations, the Taliban recently replaced Ambassador Ghulam Isaczai with Mohammad Suhail Shaheen. They ask Secretary-General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres to bring up the issue at the General Assembly (Khan, Shiraiwa, & Yoshida, 2021). These efforts will aid the Taliban regime in gaining worldwide recognition it currently lacks. However, this development is accompanied by a string of pledges from the Taliban on their potential behavior towards Afghans, the establishment of an inclusive government, and the prevention of their land from becoming a refuge for terrorists. During their first weeks in power, the Taliban showed little restraint as they sought to secure their position in the United Nations. However, the world is now watching as the Taliban adopt more moderate policies (Cogan & Gill, 2022). With the nations' confidence and backing, the Taliban will be able to negotiate with foreign powers to open their economic reservoirs, representation at international forums, and investor doors, paving the way for a more safe and prosperous future. Most of those who have managed to flee Afghanistan are highly skilled professionals and intellectuals in their fields, and they will be drawn to the country's relative peace and prosperity.

### **Integration of Civil Society in Nation Building Programs**

There have been no Afghan civil activists, intellectuals, or regular people involved in the peace process initiated by the US and the Taliban. The country's elites and intellectuals are becoming increasingly uneasy in the face of this power struggle, opening a new chapter of emigration from Afghanistan. In particular, young people in Afghanistan believe they have nowhere to go and, out of desperation, risk their lives to leave the country (Kemp, 2021). A civil war led by guerrillas will pose a threat to regional security if academics, bureaucrats, and other civil activists aren't present (Mahendru & Malik, 2021).

Afghans have a high risk population and a long history of gender discrimination, according to demographic data. In the past, the Shia Hazara were persecuted just as other minorities. To reach farther off destinations like Europe, South Asia, and Australia, young Hazara males chose for nearby migratory sites like Iran and Pakistan. Because of the dangers and high costs involved, most people, especially women and children, avoid making the perilous voyage.

To prevent women and children from receiving an education, the Taliban administration has reverted to more restrictive ideas, as noted by Cogan and Gill (2022). For economic reasons, children are coerced into working (Harrison, 2021). An intricate reality lies behind the Taliban's bold assertion that they rule Afghanistan with widespread popular support. Afghans are on the run from the Taliban, who have been targeting those who have helped the international coalition.

The economically and administratively shaky Taliban government will struggle to win over the Afghan people and establish its legitimacy without outside assistance. Although the Taliban are now in control, their rule will only be legitimate if they make significant strides toward improving the country's economy and the lives of its citizens.

### **Moderate Governing Policy**

The Taliban's stance in the area of social rights provision will determine whether or not they are recognized as a legitimate power and whether or not the rest of the world would provide aid. The international world is urging the Taliban to keep their word on a number of fronts—including security, conflict resolution, drug smuggling, and border management—if they want to stem the tide of violent insurgencies in neighboring nations.

Despite the Taliban's attempts to allay foreign community worries with claims regarding women's and minority rights, the group's ideological attitude and actual decisions are diametrically opposed to one another (Meakem & Gramer, 2021). The tribal system and the cultural traditions of Afghanistan both interpret a patriarchal perspective. When the Taliban outlaws women's sports, the Australian Cricket Board won't play with the Afghan men's squad (BBC NEWS, 2021). Businesses in Afghanistan are making preparations to replace women workers with men, while some women are leaving their jobs voluntarily.

One-third of the female population, or 48.7%, is under the age of 25, therefore young women are not accustomed to Taliban brutality (Rizwan, 2021). Women are taking to the streets to demand equal rights. The Taliban will need to rethink their approach if they don't want to face increasing international pressure in the form of sanctions. The boycott policy will cut Afghanistan off from the rest of the world, increasing the likelihood that fresh internal conflicts would arise, thereby threatening the social and security of migrants.

The Taliban, in order to reassert their authority in Afghanistan with the help of the international world, will need to demonstrate some degree of flexibility. For the world's leading powers, most notably the United States and China, Afghanistan is no longer a geopolitical arena, but rather an economic one.

In order to restore Afghanistan, the Taliban must persuade their constituent commanding officer that reconciliation and moderate policies are preferable. Moreover, the chemistry of Afghanistan on the field might eliminate problems for a practical solution to conflicts thanks to the high level of civil-military relations. It would be hopeless to demand that the Taliban administration adopt laws regulating this area of chemistry, but doing so could be a positive step forward.

#### **Refrain from Monocracy Government System**

The potential for violent disputes can be reduced by establishing a unified political structure in which all tribes and political parties are represented. Weber supports open and healthy competition between individuals and groups. Internal authorities and peoples who engage in healthy competition will be more motivated to advance the nation's social and ideal objectives. Accordingly, a politically and politically tolerant culture will permit the groups to engage in social and economic spontaneity within a structured framework (Mommson, 1989).

The similar problem exists in post-Taliban Afghanistan, with different groups, such as women and members of minority ethnicities, demanding representation in government. Although the Pashtun Taliban are in the majority, other tribes are fighting amongst themselves over whether or not to accept the Pashtun Taliban's demands for a centralized national-state administration, which is supported internationally. On the other hand, the Taliban are opposed to monarchy, the concept of "blood ties," and a government modeled after the Western model.

Security risks can be reduced with the support of governmental policy and the active participation of all social groups. Ashraf Ghani's government in Afghanistan is an example of how a monocentric government system, in which power is concentrated in the hands of a few people, cannot survive for very long. The Taliban's previous (1994) administration in Afghanistan followed a similar organizational model, and it too eventually collapsed due to the Taliban's inflexible stance on the civil and social rights of the ordinary people of various ethnicities and sexes.

The Taliban commanders must be persuaded by the Doha peace process not to restore the previous regime's strict and un-Islamic laws. Since disagreements over power structures may be settled by discussion, the system of shared governance is more reliable. This structure incorporates varying degrees of authority, from the municipal to the international. Maintaining order in society is facilitated by the ruling elite's willingness to work with communities across all levels of government, the private sector, and beyond, such as multinational enterprises. By pooling resources (via co-production, taxes, donations, and so on) and coordinating their efforts to administer the country, the country's powerful organizations can keep conflicts to a minimum (McGinnis, 2011).

The Taliban should allow everyone a fair shot at contributing to Afghanistan's safety and prosperity. The government will be more effective with people's voices being heard from all throughout the country, and international confidence will rise as a result.

#### **Measures to Overcome Humanitarian Crisis**

Instead of separating communities based on arbitrary criteria, the Taliban could launch Human Development initiatives across the entire country. Due to economic and security concerns, the Afghan country, and its youth in particular, are eager to have an opportunity to relocate in wealthy countries. Those who work as civilian aides to troops, women, and minorities in Afghanistan understandably feel threatened by the Taliban's previous administration. Both the global and local communities are waiting to see what the Taliban's new narrative means. The international world has a duty to aid Afghanistan in its effort to restore its infrastructure and liberate its people after the country has fallen into economic decline and human slavery for twenty years.

Both the individual and the national economy are affected by the sudden reduction in funding. The Taliban, per Inbar Pe'er (2021), have appointed a new finance minister and head of the Central Bank, but the issue of the government's legitimacy and international recognition remains unchanged. The US and its allies have effectively cut off the bank's access to its foreign currency reserves at the New York Federal Reserve (\$7 billion), the Bank of England, and European Banks. A round number, around \$9 billion, is involved. The United States government stated on February 11, 2022, that it will distribute \$3.5 billion of the total \$7 billion it had set aside for 9/11 victims' families.

According to the research conducted by the United Nations and Human Rights Watch consultants of aid organisations, in order to pay salaries and send cash to Afghanistan, humanitarian agencies are forced to employ informal, unregulated, and expensive money transfer methods known as "hawala" or "Sarrafi" (2022). There will be an increase in macro and micro levels of confrontation between the Taliban and Afghans if the scale of humanitarian activities is not managed.

Those who prefer to remain are wary of their legal protections, particularly women. To lessen the frequency and severity of deadly societal disputes, civil society activists work toward greater social harmony. Civil society's major focus is not on the controversial political nation-state paradigm. Many Afghans are worried that their rights would be compromised in the name of a quick peace deal. The Afghan people's most basic needs can be met with the help of international donors (Wilder & Worden, 2021).

## CONCLUSION

When a country has strong popular support, it may do great things, especially when it comes to building a strong national government. Having a framework in place that is both population-based and fiscally stable would assist the country deal with insurgent groups that seek to promote strife.

Main challenges of Afghanistan are interconnected and include recognition as legitimate government, security issues, and socioeconomic crises. The international community has brought attention to the difficulty of recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate governing body due to the extremism of its members. Donors are hesitant to put money into the country at the moment due to the unstable political climate and the poor administration of the Taliban. Because doing so would exacerbate the human disaster, foreign investors and UN organizations are hesitant to expand Afghanistan's developing program. Afghanistan's complicated political ecology and socio-cultural system also operate as roadblocks to active participation in bringing peace and stability to the country.

If a government can't provide for its people, then that country doesn't stand a chance. The bordering countries and others in the region are worried. They fear the humanitarian issue will put too much pressure on the refugee population. Afghanistan will feel the effects of the conflict in Ukraine, the COVID-19 Lockdown, and the political and economic turbulence in Pakistan.

Now more than ever, the Taliban must act swiftly to address the security threats and social upheaval of our current time. The world's opinion of the Taliban would likely improve if they established a government that relied on cooperation and moderation. The Taliban must reassure the rest of the world that their form of administration is fair and that its citizens act responsibly. Promises made by the Taliban during peace talks and after they took power should be kept. Foreign investors, diplomatic personnel, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan need the Taliban's assurance of safety.

The Taliban need to be careful when dealing with internal strife. People in rural areas, those from underrepresented groups, activists for human rights, and members of ethnic communities all need easier access to core protections. A better and more prosperous future requires actively including the communities working persistently for the peace of the country as part of the administration. Youth in Afghanistan, regardless of gender, may play an important part in nation building if given the chance to do so. In addition, it will aid in getting the international community to accept the Taliban government as a legitimate power.

The status of legitimacy, world support, women empowerment, free media and strong defensive system are the main factors to have political, financial, social stability and peace in Afghanistan.

## CREDIT AUTHORSTATEMENT

**Dr. Adeel Irfan:** Conceptualization, Reviewing and Editing, Methodology, data collection, **Aneel Waqas Khan:** analysis & write up. **Javed Iqbal:** Methodology, data collection

## COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL STANDARDS

It is declare that all authors don't have any conflict of interest. Furthermore, informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

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