Pak-Afghan Relationship: Obstacles and Opportunities

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ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of the article is to examine the complex nature of the Pakistani and Afghani relationship. Our strained relationship is sometimes attributed to the fact that Afghanistan has been militarily prepared as a unified force for policy purposes ever since Pakistan's founding in 1947. The objective of the study is to figure out why there has been animosity between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite the fact that Afghanistan is a neighboring country. The fundamental issue is the government's ability to acknowledge the Durand line disagreement. Although the Durand Line is recognized internationally, the Afghan ethnic group does not. Nonetheless, trade and other operations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are conducted across this boundary. A constructive approach is applied to elaborate the relationships which can be bolstered through negative communication and two-way dialogue. The study evaluates that both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to sit down together in awe as the deadline for resolving the Taliban's Durand Line other aims approaches.

KEYWORDS

Af-Pak policy, Durand line, civil war, IDPs

INTRODUCTION

Nearly, two decades later, in August 2021, the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan. Many unanswered issues remain about the future of events, trends, and policies in the so-called Taliban regime. Pakistan can learn valuable lessons from the course of bilateral ties since 1947 as it readies itself for certain outcomes in Afghanistan under the new leadership of the Taliban. The 1947 Comparative Study of the States. As an example, think about how Pakistan helped millions of Afghans escape the country's "civil war" between 1992 and 1996 and the exodus during the Taliban's rule. In contrast, human interactions necessitate a two-way embrace. There has been a lot written about this discrepancy over the years, but how do we account for it now, given what we know about Afghanistan and Pakistan's relationship? Sad state-to-state interactions may be better understood by comparing pre-modern and modern times, two phenomena that emerged in the historical and geographical context of colonial powers like Britain. A long-term historical context must be presented and contrasted with the emergence of modern nation-states. We argue that a deep dive into the region's past is required for a full picture and to draw parallels to the present day. There is a brief overview of the region's intellectual history, then a discussion of the three eras of interstate ties. From 1947 until Afghanistan's claims of irredentism in 1978 caused the country to abandon its policy of a "non-leftist coup d'état in 1978," Afghanistan followed a "non-leftist coup d'état in 1978." The period from 1979 to 2001 saw state-to-proxy interactions supplant direct state-to-state ties. The Mujahideen's Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was eager to take the helm of the new Afghan government, but this did not happen. After developing connections with the Taliban in 1994, Pakistan watched as they overran Kabul in 1996 but were unable to establish their rule across the country. Since 2001, when the third phase began, Islamabad and Kabul have had restored state-to-state ties, but Pakistan has not stopped providing support to the Taliban and other proxy groups operating in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the phenomenon known as the "double game" has been on the rise. The Taliban appear unfazed by the loss of a reconciliation process with the Afghan government. Taking a few seconds glance at each of these stages, we make three primary points. First, the post-colonial experience and historical links that have permeated locals' lives for decades are to blame for the lingering hostility between states. For another, the governing classes of the two countries have had very distinct life experiences.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Eric (2017) believed that this second issue, particularly in the context of a zero-sum game with India, is at the heart of a chasm between the goals of successive Afghan governments and Pakistan's ongoing regional security strategy. Daoud Khan, president from 1976 to 1978, and Zahir Shah, king from 1963 to 1972, both sought better ties with Pakistan, which were
The controversial Durand line, drawn up by the British colonial power but not recognized by Afghanistan, has existed since before Pakistan was even founded. Political tensions have complicated the relationship between the two countries for the better part of the last decade. Although Pakistan's aid in the struggle against the Soviet occupation is widely recognized, widespread anti-Pakistani sentiment has developed in Afghanistan as a result of what is seen as "meddling." Both countries share many similarities, yet their bilateral relationship has suffered from periodic conflicts. Despite being a symbol of colonial arrogance and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line also represented a sense of shared experience (Khan, 2016).

Walsh (2011) asserted that it was so divisive because Pashtuns on either side of the border felt a connection to one another based on a common cultural and historical heritage. It's strange that the two countries have only talked about their relationship at the political level in the past, given the deep linkages that exist between their societies and their states. Many Afghan observers have zeroed in on Pakistani Government and ISI participation in Afghanistan, and the same can be said of the vast majority of Pakistani analysts, who range from government officials and journalists to think tank researchers and academics. Whereas Pakistan typically disregards the nuances and complexity of Afghan society, Afghanistan frequently fails to see that the ISI is distinct from the rest of Pakistani society and politics. This was consistent with the widespread misunderstanding of Afghanistan that prevailed in Western governments and intellectual circles, which led to the mistaken belief that Afghanistan's external displays of statehood and democracy were indicative of a legitimate and functioning government. It's possible that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which is currently irrelevant to this remark, will become so in the future, though to a far lesser extent and under quite different circumstances than the regions outside of major cities where the state's legitimacy was before present.

The efforts to end the Afghan war have largely focused on the interests of three parties: the Afghan government, the Taliban, and the United States. All three have a vested stake in the outcome of the conflict and are actively engaged in it. Prior to the withdrawal of US and other soldiers on August 31, 2021, the future stability of Afghanistan and the chances for the delayed peace process are unknown. Pakistan, the fourth player, is essential to both because of the role it has played in the struggle from its position on Afghanistan's eastern border. Reportedly, former US President Donald Trump urged Pakistan for assistance in 2018 in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, and later lauded Pakistan's efforts to "advancing the Afghanistan peace process" when intra-Afghan talks began almost two years later. This outreach highlights Pakistan's symbiotic relationship with the Taliban, whom it has sheltered and funded for the better part of the last two decades. A large number of senior Taliban officials remain based in Pakistan, where they have family, property, and access to medical care for their injured fighters. Afghan government and citizens alike are well aware that Pakistan is to blame for the current crisis because of the country's role in aiding the Taliban. (Woodward, 2002).

Pakistan disputes having any influence over the Taliban, but many Afghans are confused as to why it maintains connections with the group and has not put greater pressure on them to reduce the bloodshed. When asked about peace talks with the Taliban, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said in 2015 in Washington, DC, "The problem, ultimately, is not about peace with Taliban. Resolving tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is essential to solving the problem.

Tensions between Islamabad and Kabul date back to 1947, when Pakistan was founded after India was partitioned. Conflicts between Afghanistan and India left a severe legacy throughout the period when the area was ruled by the British Empire. In spite of the Durand Line being recognized as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance have claimed territory in Pakistan's Pashtun and Baluchi provinces. The same actors, such as transnational Islamists and their safe havens in Pakistan, play a role in today's cross-border insurgencies as they did in the conflicts of the past. Borderlands in the twenty-first century are interwoven in worldwide conflict networks, thus the arrangements formed in the nineteenth century to preserve the frontier of the British Empire by isolating Afghanistan as a buffer state no longer apply.

As Haqqani (2005) points out that if the United States and other international forces are serious about helping the new Afghan government and stabilizing the region, they should push for a multidimensional conversation and peace-building process that centers on the concerns along the border. Although pressure will not be adequate on its own, it may be necessary to encourage some actors to take such a process seriously.

Carol (2008) said that the plan should recognize the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, allow Afghanistan access to Pakistani ports and transit facilities, and keep the borders open for trade, investment, and cultural exchange. These goals will help bring the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan into the mainstream of Pakistani politics and administration. The United States, NATO, and the United Nations all pressured Pakistan to stop allowing Taliban paradises to remain in the country because they posed a threat to international stability. Also, they need to be in agreement to force Afghanistan and India to drive Pakistan into making tough choices by addressing the root reasons of Pakistan's instability, such as the border area and Kashmir.

In the weeks before President Bush's trip to South Asia in the middle of March 2006, violence erupted on both sides of the border, particularly in the 5,000 square mile territory comprising Waziristan and the South and North Agencies.
Approximately 300 Islamic militants, army personnel, and Pakistani soldiers were killed in this fight, which also resulted in the displacement of one million people from the Pakistani city of Miran Shah, the administrative hub of North Waziristan. Across the border in South Waziristan, Islamist militants are using landmines, missiles, assassinations, and skirmishes to reclaim lost territory, plan new operations, and gradually impose their will on a remote area, making it a miniature version of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Districts adjacent to the Northwest Frontier Province are just as violent as the province itself. Afghanistan was isolated as a buffer state in the nineteenth century to protect the frontier of the British Empire, but these arrangements no longer function for a borderland in the twenty-first century that is entangled in worldwide conflict networks. When the communists overthrew President Daud in April 1978, they also overthrew the ruling Durrani dynasty in Afghanistan, which led to an opening of the borders and the continuation of the war between the two countries. (Ahmad, 2017).

The Soviet assault of the border regions on Christmas Eve, 1979, was a pivotal turning point that paved the way for the conflict to go worldwide. As a result of the Soviet invasion, Pakistan has emerged as a crucial U.S. partner. To a significant extent, the reigning army in Afghanistan determined the direction of the Afghan resistance, which had its foundation in the refugee camps along the Durand Line. Pakistan, fearing the rise of Afghan nationalist extremists on its territory, refused to recognize the parties and exiles linked with the previous regime. It has rerouted aid from Western Europe, China, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other countries to Islamists, who receive generous funding from affluent individuals in the Gulf. The administration of Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq has decreed the jihad in neighboring Afghanistan as a means to its principal purpose to "Islamize" Pakistan. The Pashtun province east of the boundary Durand was renamed "Pakhtunkhwa" after nationalistic Pashtun political groups with seats in the national and provincial legislatures of Pakistan lowered their ambitions. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and other regions of Baluchistan, as well as tribal groups, will all be incorporated into this new province. Pakistan's Afghan politics remained under the authority of the military even after the transition to a nominally civilian administration in 1988 and continued until 1999. Pakistan underwent a radical shift from aiding seminaries to providing equipment to local Islamist organizations. Pakistan has been involved in the Cold War confrontation, the post-Cold War civil strife, and the war on terror in and around Afghanistan as a way to deal with India, a country with more than eight times its population and economic capital. According to Pakistanis, the Indian elite partially or wholly deny Pakistan's legitimacy to exist. Pakistan support for the Taliban and other Islamist groups, especially Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Islamic Party (Bearden, 2001).

Bradsher (1983) confirmed that the defensible territory along its border that provides strategic depth for the Pakistani military. That is to say, Pakistan made an effort to prop up an Afghan client state that would provide its armed troops breathing room to retreat and reorganize in the event of a conflict with India. The British maintained this strategy because they saw Afghanistan as an important part of a buffer zone between South Asia and the rest of the world. Following the Geneva Accords signed in February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces on April 14, 1988, and a conversation between the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to pave the way for elections to be overseen by a transitional government. Implementation of the Geneva Accords would have resulted in a weak Afghan government with ties to the Soviet Union but no Soviet troops on the ground in Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Afghan state resulted from the continuation of the conflict without a firm political resolution of the borders. After the death of Zia-ul-Haq in an airplane crash in August 1988, representative governance was restored in Pakistan, and the United States and Pakistan began working together to counter Soviet influence. Pakistan's national and provincial legislatures are now home to nationalist Pashtun political groups, which have moderated their goals and renamed the Pashtun province east of the border from Durand to Pakhtunkhwa. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) along with other districts in Baluchistan and tribal groups will all be incorporated into this new province. Afghan politics in Pakistan remained under military control even after a transition to an apparently civilian government occurred between 1988 and 1999. No reform initiative can succeed if it is not accompanied by a strategy for boosting the economy. The Awami National Party has asked the World Bank or another foreign agency to conduct a detailed baseline study to evaluate the economic situation and help Pakistan and the people of the FATA build a comprehensive plan. As a first step, this strategy will link FATA to Afghanistan's reconstruction by designating special opportunity zones along the Durand Line. Efforts are being made on the Afghan side to establish such zones. Musharraf first suggested their formation in May 2006, with American help (Carter, 1980).

**CHALLENGES IN THE PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONSHIP**

Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have persisted for decades. Conflicts between counterterrorism forces, the influx of refugees, the spread of illegal drugs, the activities of activist groups, and the facilitation of contact between terrorist groups have all harmed relations and eroded trust. When there are issues with the security market, it becomes more challenging to forge stronger links in the commercial and trading sectors. Despite setbacks, Afghanistan still relies on Pakistan as its primary commercial partner, and Pakistan relies on Afghanistan as its second-largest trading partner. It is expected that in the future years, combined demand in Kabul will drop due to a reduction in aid and other forms of foreign exchange inflows. Therefore, Pakistan needs to come up with strategies to mitigate the impact of this economic crisis. Due to its landlocked status,
Afghanistan will have to continue relying on Pakistan and Iran as its primary trading partners. Participants in Afghanistan were interested in working together to create a common economic zone that may boost bilateral trade. Huge opportunities exist for Pakistani businesses in Afghanistan, but only if bureaucracy is reduced, citizens feel safe, and infrastructure is improved.

Compared to the meager $0.83 billion in FY06, trade between Islamabad and Kabul soared to $2.1 billion in FY13. Since 2011, a number of factors, including political upheaval, delays at customs, the suspension of NATO supplies, and others—have contributed to a decline in the share of imports originating in Pakistan—which accounted for 24.3% as of FY13.2. Iran's percentage of transit trade has increased during the past few years, while Pakistan's has fallen. Iran's Chabahar Port in the Gulf of Oman will serve as the starting point for a land route to the Persian Gulf, following the recent completion of the draught transit agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan. With exports reaching $363.70 million in FY13, Afghanistan is no longer a major source of imports (now accounting for only 5% of all imports).

As the third largest recipient, Pakistan receives 32.2% of all Afghan shipments (Chapra, 2012). Initial staffing for the APTTA began in 1965 in Kabul and a further two countries. Afghan exports to the Pakistani cities of Karachi and Gwadar are now legal according to a 2010 amendment to the APTTA. Trucks from Pakistan will also carry goods across Afghanistan. As a result of the pact, a Joint Chamber of Commerce was established. First step toward creating North-South trade corridor was July 2012’s APTTA extension to Tajikistan. With this planned deal in place, Tajikistan would be able to export and import commodities to Pakistan via the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, in addition to benefiting from commerce with Pakistan thanks to the transit arrangement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In search of new commercial prospects, a ministerial team from Tajikistan has come in Pakistan. In November 2014, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani traveled to Pakistan in an effort to improve relations with the country's neighbors, particularly with New Delhi. Ghani has promised that trade between his country and Pakistan will reach $5 billion by 2017. Cordobez (1995) said that in return, Afghanistan agreed that within 24 hours, Pakistan would remove 95% of imports made under the Transit Trade Agreement and reduce port and storage tariffs and fees. The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan need to sign more treaties if their countries are ever going to benefit from cooperative commerce.

These suggestions will help you make progress on your lengthy journey: For the sake of fostering long-term commercial relationships, it is imperative that the current limits on business visas be eased. Solutions such as visa-on-arrival, long-term, multiple-entry visas, and visas that are friendly to investment for businesses and skilled workers are all possibilities that might be explored and implemented. A preferential trade agreement between the two countries is necessary now to address the smuggling issue and improve market access for Afghan goods in Pakistan. This agreement should contain a comprehensive strategy for regional tariff simplification and the removal of double taxation in order to attract and retain foreign direct investment in both countries.

Third, as part of this agreement, both sides should commit to helping facilitate the movement of commodities from Pakistan to Central Asia via Afghanistan, and vice versa for Afghan exports to India via Pakistan. Improved non-tariff measures are also necessary, especially at ports of entry where customs procedures take place. Reforms at both the operational and policy levels are needed to boost trade, such as reducing the price of inspecting and testing cargo and beefing up security. It would be impossible to overestimate the importance of today's transportation networks, notably the highway and rail system, to the success of businesses worldwide. Reduced transportation costs should be a primary objective in the planning of infrastructure improvements in both countries. It's important to remember that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would be vital in expanding business ties between countries in Central Asia and South Asia. There must be a monetary system in place to facilitate trade. For multi-currency trade settlements and a formal arrangement for costs such as freight insurance, setting up an EXIM bank is recommended (Cogan, 1993).

**Non-Interference and Peaceful Coexistence**

Among Pashtun cultural institutions, the Jirga is widely considered to be the most ancient and influential. Jirga "had both a political and a judicial character" and is unquestionably seen as fundamental to and constitutive of Pashtun culture. Reducing foreign aid to insurgent organizations, promoting more support for Kabul, and strengthening reconciliation efforts are all examples of areas where regional governments may work more closely together. The lack of supporting evidence persists for this assertion.

The ideals of "mutual respect, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence" were also affirmed as the foundation for future bilateral ties. Afghanistan's political leaders have shown national unity throughout the country's century-long challenges by relying on a dedicated Jirga, or Grand National Assembly. Since the first one was convened in 1923 and the first Afghan Constitution was ratified, there have been a total of eighteen loyal jirgas. They originated with Afghanistan's founding constitutions. As democratic institutions were rebuilt after the Taliban government was toppled in 2001, the loyal Jirga system was a crucial component. The temporary agreements reached at the 2001 Bonn Conference were recognized by an Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ), and the redrafted Afghan constitution was confirmed by a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) that met from late 2003 to early 2004. In 2004, a constitution was enacted that formally defined the composition and role of loya jirgas. The constitution calls for a loya jirga to be held every ten years, but this has not happened because the majority of its members, who are supposed to be elected from district councils, have never been chosen. 2013 (Solomon) At a time when the constitutional foundation of Afghanistan is increasingly being questioned, the inability to hold a loya jirga in accordance with the constitution
undermines it even further. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani have hosted Loya jirgas on an ad hoc basis during the past two decades to give the appearance of national unity at times of crisis, while being unable to do so on the basis of the constitution. It's a paradox that this approach prevents constitutional amendments from being made through constitutional processes and also prevents constitutional loya jirgas from being called to fill in the blanks (Lone, 2010).

**Drugs Trafficking: A Major Hurdle**

Despite the vast distance between Afghanistan and Lebanon, as well as the differences in the cultures in which each group operates, both the Taliban and Hezbollah have shifted their focus from philosophy to drug trafficking as a means of supplementing or even replacing their "maturing elective income streams." Throughout this encounter, Hezbollah and the Taliban built elaborate worldwide dissemination organizations, expanding their roles far beyond maintaining of political rule and the pursuit of their philosophical aims within their native countries. The territories where the Taliban and Hezbollah originated have undeniably been hotspots for drug manufacture. "(Edward, 2011)" Unchecked weed growth occurred in the Bekaa valley in the latter half of the 1970s and the middle of the 1980s as a result of the Lebanese Civil War disrupting most of the country\'s financial transactions and the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon creating a conduit for the import of hashish from Lebanon into Israel. Founded in the middle of the 1980s with heavy recruitment from significant Bekaa Valley clans and families, Hezbollah benefited from a severe order, or fatwa, imposed at the time granting strict validity to the generally dirty and illegal movement of pharmaceutical selling. Allegedly given by conservative Iranian pioneers, the fatwa said, "We, America, and the Jews, create medications for Satan. If we are unable to eliminate them through the use of firearms, we will resort to pharmaceuticals. In a memo from November 2008 that was recently declassified, the FBI said that "Hizbullah\'s profound chief... has indicated that opiates trafficking is ethically pleasing if the meds are provided to Western rebels as part of the battle against the opponents of Islam." enter any case, Hezbollah is motivated by its financial needs, and its response to drug dealing remains a fatwa and deals to enter discussions.

Embree (1979) said that Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, views narcotics as a plague and, for as long as he allowed Raqqa Hariri to remain in power, he helped his government combat the problem. Nasr Allah is deeply troubled by the drug problem, but that hasn\'t stopped his organization from making huge profits off of it. In 2008, professionals from the United States and Colombia collaborated on Operation Titan, which uncovered and "destroyed a cocaine-carrying and criminal tax avoidance association that allegedly assisted store Hezbollah activities." Cocaine worth millions of dollars is washed annually, with 12% of the profits going to Hezbollah. At least one of those caught in the trap was Chekry Harb, a Lebanese boss living in Colombia who had been given permission by Colombian officials to keep in regular phone contact with Hezbollah leaders and to travel to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. (Feifer, 2009). When the Lebanese Canadian Bank\'s recent tax evasion plan was taken over by two Lebanese cash trade companies, Kasseimi Rmeiti and Co. for Trade and Halawi Trade Co., in April 2013, the Depository Office once again accused Hezbollah of worldwide drug trafficking and slapped a boycott on the two companies. The Taliban had the same off-kilter problem as Hezbollah: reconciling the differences between their Islamic faith and the narcotics trade. Of course, luck was on their side, as everyone knows. After seizing power, the Taliban "incapacitated the population, implementing the rule of peace and law, imposing strict Sharia law, opening the streets to traffic, which quickly reduced food prices on the grounds that a depleted, war-exhausted populace thought of them as friends in need and peacemakers." People there are quite accepting, so they embraced all of the changes.

Under Taliban authority, a little plot producing merely 45 grams of opium per year could fetch its possessor almost $1,000, a fortune in rural Afghanistan. In order to ensure the faith of the Deobandi and to facilitate the development of medicines. Despite the Koranic prohibition on the production and consumption of intoxicants, the Taliban have issued farmers an Islamic license to increase opium production. Abdul Rashid, the commander of the Taliban\'s opponents in Kandahar\'s fight against illegal drugs, has outlined the strategy behind his own innovative program. Since "Afghans and Muslims consume it," he has the authority to prohibit its cultivation entirely. But Rashid advises me, without irony: "Opium is acceptable given that it is burned through [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans" (Giffen, 2009). Hezbollah\'s tactic, which seeks to outlaw (read: wish ceaselessly for) opium and heroin usage while tolerating the manufacture and distribution of both, is strikingly similar to the pragmatic approach. The poppy harvest increased from 2,248 to 4,565 metric tons between 1996 and 1999, and the association between the Taliban and heroin production became stronger as a result of the horrific province of Afghan cases at the time the Taliban seized power and the economic disaster brought on by Talibanization. Because of international pressure against Afghan drug production and the Taliban regime\'s poor track record on ordinary freedoms, Mullah Omar has now ordered a 33% cut in the poppy harvest, reducing the harvest down to 3,276 metric tons in 2000. Despite this reduction, the collection is still expected to generate a projected absolute value of US $900 million, which is more than three times the size of Afghanistan\'s $2.5 billion GDP that year and more than four times the size of Afghanistan\'s $130 million in legal travel expenditures. Abdul Rashid, the commander of the Taliban\'s opponents in Kandahar\'s fight against illegal drugs, has outlined the strategy behind his own innovative program. Since "Afghans and Muslims consume it," he has the authority to prohibit its cultivation entirely. Rashid replies, without irony, that Westerners, not Muslims or Afghans, are the ones who are burning through the opium, thus it\'s okay (Goodson, 2001).
Because of its strong opinions, the pharmaceutical business typically contains and frequently highlights connections to weaken state components at various levels of government. Some official authorities or even small sectors of public authority, including a few security-related departments, maybe as profoundly, if not more deeply, involved in the illegal drug trade than radicals. The drug trade serves multiple purposes in conflict zones, including but not limited to the following: I. "I. enabling the financial gain of illicit enterprises, with all related social and economic repercussions such as corruption. The local population, especially those living in remote, underdeveloped areas, depends largely on this revenue to play an adaptive role as a social-economic coping and survival strategy. The third category is "Financing armed actors," which refers to those who "actively finance the war effort, weaponry, equipment purchases, etc. using earnings from drug sales." The complex role that the illegal drug trade plays in war zones explains why there isn't a direct causal relationship between drug use and war violence (battle, psychological warfare, public cruelty, etc.). The fifth objective is to examine the relationship between drugs and conflict violence as two separate factors operating within a self-governing system.

The counter-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, which took place between 1979 and 1989, is one example of how armed conflict can help advance the pharmaceutical industry. (Azam, 1982). Flooding could occur even in relatively safe areas, such as those that were once under the Taliban administration in the mid to late 1990s. Over time, the United States has modified its counternarcotics strategy, cutting certain programs while expanding others to make them more consistent with the broader counterinsurgency strategy. The five tenets of the 2005 United States anti-drug policy were prohibition, equity reform, public data, disposal/annihilation, and voluntary employment. As a result of the ties between drug dealers and extremists, the United States rethought its Branch of Guard (Safeguard) strategy and rules of commitment going ahead to allow for greater military participation in anti-drug efforts in Afghanistan. An increased focus on prohibition activities and more aid for farmers are two examples of how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has evolved to better coordinate with counterinsurgency efforts.

The United States government employs a number of methods to combat the drug trade, but large-scale poppy farming is an integral aspect of this approach. That's why they're advocating for more accurate statistics about the global counternarcotics drive. Although the GAO made every effort to do so, it was handicapped by its absence of execution measures and interval execution focuses, which are considered to be among the best practices in the sector and are essential for quantifying Afghan limits. The U.S. counternarcotics program has led to significant progress in American offices throughout the countries it serves. Protection teaches Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions independently, and the program uses break execution focuses to evaluate success along the way. Especially in locations where a revolt is in control, examples of the destruction of public data attempts caused by impotent security can be found. Other problems exist, but they only manifest in isolated parts of the software. Afghanistan's public safety forces are the only one organization plagued by drug abuse and addiction. The framework of any effective program is shaped in large part by observation and evaluation. Regular evaluation is useful for program managers since it improves decision-making, boosts the program's suitability, and reveals fresh avenues for growth. U.S. groups have monitored the evolution of the counternarcotics initiative across the globe through a combination of on-site inspections, employee disclosures, and external audits. (Lone, 2013). When it comes to drug and weapon destruction, for instance, the United States Department of State's Division of (State) periodically provided data that was analyzed by the Joint Countries Office of Medicines and Wrongdoing. To assure the initiatives' continued performance, the United States government actively monitored and recorded evaluations of them. We recommend the following four steps be taken by the United States government to enhance its ability to keep tabs on anti-drug efforts. Third, the Secretary of Defense sets performance goals to evaluate how well the CNPA is being trained. The ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to monitor the level of drug traffickers arrested and convicted can be improved if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the DEA and the Attorney General, creates clear definitions for low, mid, and high-level traffickers.

Concessions with the Afghan Government:

It appears that Pakistan is entering a period comparable to that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, when multiple mujahideen organizations fought to wipe out their rivals, following the fall of Dr. Najibullah and before the entrance of the Taliban. As the Taliban in Pakistan expand their jihad to compete with Islamist meetings, it becomes more likely that other Islamist local armies will be drawn into a joint war among extreme gatherings. The global repercussions of this unexpected event would be far greater than those of the mujahideen conflicts in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s. In 1996, on September 27th, the Taliban took Kabul with little resistance. After receiving refuge at the UN Base camp in Kabul for more than four years, former Afghan president Dr. Najeeb Ullah and his siblings were assassinated on the spot. Mullah Muhammad Omar, Amir Ul Momineen, appointed a council of six members to serve as Shura's leaders. Mullah Muhammad Rabbani is the Pastor of Police and Boundary Zones, Mullah Muhammad Hassan is the Clergyman of Protection, Mullah Abdul Razzaq is the Clergyman of Instruction, Mullah Syed Ghias Ud Clamor is the Priest of International Concerns, and Mullah Muhammad Ghaus is the Priest of Safety, among other titles. The Taliban group, in its earliest statements, emphasized the importance of enforcing Islamic law, particularly protections for women" (Montagnola, 1963)"

They kept to Islamic Law and Rule with a progressive spirit, unmoved by international criticism and debate. Possibly they did so without thinking about the obstacles faced by women under the Taliban's Islamic Laws. As a result of the Soviet invasion and subsequent fighting, many Afghans were forced to leave their homes and seek refuge in Pakistan. The percentage
of Pakistani madrassas controlled by the JUI has grown steadily over the years. These Deobandi factions served as the original incubators for the Taliban. According to Ahmed Rashid, who characterizes this time period as one that "implanted extremist beliefs in responsive impoverishment plagued youth," the Taliban "get on track to institute an important plan: reestablish unity, incapacitate the populace, implement Shri 'a... and protect Islam in Afghanistan." Al-Momineen According to Amir Mullah Umer, the primary responsibility of government is to establish a system of sustainable equity. While reviewing the report about the organization of Equity presented by Mullah Abdul Ghafoor Sanae, the Main Equity, Amir Ul Momineen emphasized the importance of strong measures for providing prompt equity to people, resolving their complaints, and providing them with treatment at the earliest opportunity. As a result of the Soviet invasion and subsequent fighting, many Afghans were forced to leave their homes and seek refuge in Pakistan (Telukdar, 2018).

The percentage of Pakistani madrassas controlled by the JUI has grown steadily over the years. These Deobandi factions served as the original incubators for the Taliban. This time, says Ahmed Rashid, was when the Taliban "began to get on track to enact a vital plan" by planting "extreme notions in receptive destitute youths."

From the middle of the 1990s onward, the typically stringent educational programs of many madrassas contracted into an educational approach designed to produce jihadists who were willing to submit to aggression and who were primarily motivated by their philosophy. According to Ahmed Rashid, many Taliban recruits (including English-speaking Pakistanis) merely had brief periods of philosophical Deobandi indoctrination before "being dispatched off the bleeding edge by Taliban initiates, who frequently came up with ISI officers." So, these individuals fought for the Northern Partnership and the United States in Afghanistan and Kashmir while being managed by the Indian military. Several groups, NATO-ISAF objectives, mutual dependence, and advances in Pakistani military power have all distinguished Afghanistan's post-Soviet era (Ahmed, 2017). During the first of these two epochs, when Pakistani attackers battled and ascended through the Taliban positions prior to their expulsion in 2001, future PNT administrators were exposed to non-Afghan jihadists, notably those rehearsing a violent and globally organised style of Islamism. Therefore, unlike in the madrassas of Pakistan that the Deobandis had previously dominated, the ideology taught in Afghanistan was largely more political (and global). Some people claim that the "growing" of the Pakistani soldiers' philosophical outlook made them more tolerant of divergent viewpoints than their more modern, narrow-minded madrassa-educated peers, which led to a convergence of political impulses and outmoded Deobandi ideals. The neo-fundamentalist global jihad radicalization supplied by al-Qaida inspired both Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulavi Nazir to participate in the Soviet-Afghan Conflict. The Taliban's fight against the Northern Coalition included the efforts of trailblazers like Nek Mohammad. Hakimullah Mehsud, who was born in 1981, is not thought to have fought in Afghanistan before 2002; rather, he is thought to have obtained his tactical experience through fighting the Pakistani military and other PNT organizations in the ancestral zones of Pakistan. We're back to talking about Pakistan's efforts to broker peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Discussions between Afghan, Pakistani, and American authorities stalled in late July after the revelation of Mullah Omar's death, and that was the main topic of discussion during the "Heart of Asia" Ecclesiastical Meeting in Islamabad on December 9, 2015. But despite this, especially in light of the current circumstances, it isn't unanimously accepted that it's wise to revive compromise conversations with the Taliban (Mushtaq & Baig, 2015). As a result of a few prior attempts, the Taliban now have the veneer of legitimacy necessary to present themselves as a political entity on par with the Afghan government without fear of repercussions. On the other hand, it's hard to imagine any other options that would work. Changes on the ground in Afghanistan's war zone since the year's midpoint have only served to underline the fundamental nature of the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Deadlock; no one can claim victory with any confidence. Finding common ground, whatever of the impetus for the talks, will be challenging. Afghanistan and Pakistan need to have professionals who can set aside their differences and work together. It was acknowledged at the Core of Asia meeting, but the deep mistrust between the two neighbors was also on display (Haqqani, 2005). The favourable response to Afghan president Ashraf Ghani's efforts to satisfy Pakistan shows that the two countries have recently found areas of accord. However, they continue to make ridiculous assumptions for one another on the front of compromise since they have been pointing fingers at one another since the breakdown of the late spring negotiations with the Taliban. Restarting negotiations is impossible unless the fundamental points of disagreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan are addressed. The degree of buy-in from Afghanistan's divided government, the speed with which talks will result in a decrease in savagery, and whether or not Pakistan and Afghanistan can agree on a system to deal with those who are opposing the Afghan state and are opposed to talks are the three most pressing issues that need to be addressed immediately. The normal labor in Pakistan is maybe the most significant difference in the discussions. Many Afghans believe Pakistani officials are helping the Taliban and the Haqqani network perpetrate atrocities in their nation, thus they accuse those officials. When it comes to lowering bloodshed in Afghanistan, it is Pakistan's responsibility to do whatever is necessary, including taking military action if necessary. According to Hussain (2020). But the government in Kabul would rather talk to a weak Taliban than with the insurgency, therefore negotiations are necessary. Pakistan maintains it is helpless to stop the savagery in Afghanistan and should only be held responsible for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, but the international community ignores this and does nothing. Pakistan has stated that it will put pressure on the Taliban throughout the late spring negotiations and will be willing to compromise on the outcomes if the violence in Afghanistan continues and the Taliban refuse to participate in the talks; however,
the outcomes are unknown, Pakistan will not take responsibility for the failure of the talks, and it will not consent to reject the Taliban for it. After several years of trying, the West still hasn't managed to persuade Pakistan to launch a major military offensive against the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Although Pakistan's level of support appears to have fluctuated, nothing has changed that is likely to help revive conversations in the near future. The continuation of the current levels of cruelty in Afghanistan also makes it impossible to sustain conversations for very long. Finding a compromise that addresses the rising bloodshed in Afghanistan at the hands of Pakistan-based forces while also bringing the Taliban initiative to the table is necessary, but it would be unwise to count on Pakistan to launch a large-scale military campaign against the Taliban.

Afghanistan and Pakistan should maintain open, honest, and insight-driven communications to identify any parties, explorers, or local authorities who might be opposed to negotiations or actively working against them. By accepting a tailor-made premise, Pakistan would focus on taking decisive action, such as raising economic pressure, detaining (and maybe handing over detainees to Kabul) or using force against persons working in its shadows. It has been suggested that a more targeted strategy could restrict the movement and attacks of the Taliban and other psychological militant groups within Afghanistan. In addition, it might avert measures that would effectively compel them into Afghanistan, where they would pose an even larger threat to the already strained Afghan security forces (Bano, 2019). Since Pakistan wouldn't be required to take part in efforts against the Taliban's on-the-run development, and since it would only be acting directly against those Taliban chiefs opposed to dialogue, it is likely to be more agreeable to this mission. Pakistani officials have long worried about a possible betrayal by the Taliban. In retaliation for Pakistan's actions, Afghanistan has pledged to crack down hard on the Pakistani Taliban, who are known to undertake assaults within Pakistan from Afghan territory. It will be difficult to put this strategy into action without an early victory. Both parties would need to swiftly settle on a set of concrete objectives and next steps. These successes should be shared as widely as possible and used to rally more people behind the compromise plan. Reduced extreme violence in Afghanistan will be the decisive factor of simple dialogue outcomes. Afghanistan's security forces are unlikely to win a decisive victory without substantial financial compensation to the Taliban. That's why it's so important to settle on the terms of a ceasefire as quickly as feasible. Given the ongoing debates over the legitimacy of the Taliban in power, it's possible that additional rounds of conversation are too much for this interaction to handle at the moment. The Taliban representatives at the table cannot convince Afghan and Pakistani experts that they can successfully control the conflict in Afghanistan unless their commitment to a ceasefire is tested. As a returning Pakistani professional, Ghani also seems to be under some sort of strain. In order to move on with the compromise talks, experts from Afghanistan and Pakistan will need to agree on short, typically definitive deadlines that, ideally, will be established well in advance of the 2016 fighting season in Afghanistan. The next round of talks should focus especially on the issue of a ceasefire. Braitwai (2011) said that Pakistan should encourage the Taliban to negotiate by making fair requests and presumptions of them. Experts in Afghanistan should continue to use the same level of common sense. Maintaining pressure on the Taliban as negotiations progress is crucial if the organization is going to bargain freely and give credit where credit is due.

ANALYSIS OF PAK-AFGHAN LEADERSHIP:

When compared to Afghanistan under the era of the Taliban, the country is showing many indicators of economic, social, and societal revival. More than 8 million Afghan students, including over 2 million girls, are enrolled in schools across the country, and the country's GDP is now $20 billion, up from $2 billion in 2001. Particularly, Afghanistan has already successfully held two parliamentary and government decisions and is gearing up for a third in 2014 and 2015. However, the Taliban still poses a challenge to Afghanistan. Even if the Afghan government values Pakistan's help, the Islamist regime poses a serious challenge to both Pakistani and Afghan nationalists. Military victory has been uncertain 12 years into the US-led fight against the Taliban, mostly due to the US shifting priority onto Iraq in 2003 and Pakistan's sustained backing for the Taliban. Pakistan supported them and secured their authority in fights with NATO and the Afghan government, while American involvement in Iraq provided the impetus for them to reorganize. After trying everything military to destroy the Taliban, NATO decided to back the Afghan government's offer of peace to the Taliban. Whatever the reason, the Taliban has not changed its hostile and stubborn stance. As reported by Bukhari (2005), with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan starting in 1989, the Afghan nationalist government at the time attempted to talk with mujahideen leaders (the "Peshawar Seven") but was thwarted by Pakistan. Najibullah, after a decade of fighting, sought Pakistan's assistance in finding a political resolution by proposing the formation of a government of popular solidarity with the mujahideen. Despite repeated overtures from Pakistan, the "Peshawar Seven" refused to accept the concept and instead urged the overthrow of President Najibullah's regime. The Taliban have a significant motive to keep up antagonism and to struggle for unchecked control because of Pakistan's consistent backing. Pakistan unquestionably has the ability to pressure the Taliban into negotiating a genuine settlement with the Afghan government. That's not the end game Pakistan needs to keep an eye on in Afghanistan; rather, it appears to want to establish a tactical arrangement like this, or a formalized government structure, in which the Taliban should hold the most control and be in the driver's seat. Since a political settlement in Afghanistan will surely lead to a government of moderate patriots, the Taliban appear uncertain. Pakistan has similarly little enthusiasm for backing a moderate nationalist administration in Afghanistan. Reason is: if the Taliban are in charge, the system won't interfere with Pakistani authority or crucial plans. Similarly, Pakistan
thinks the Taliban may be used to settle the Pashtuistan problem and the Durand Line because they are disinterested in both of these concerns (Khan, 2017).

According to reports, Pakistan has no actual knowledge of the different dangers posed by the Afghan Taliban, yet this doesn't stop it from entering into amicable arrangements with them. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are currently amazed by the Taliban. Regardless, it appears that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are more committed to their goal of imposing a strong Sharia-based administrative system in the wider area than to Pakistani interests versus Afghanistan. Since the reestablishment of the Caliphate is the ultimate goal of Islamists, it is no surprise that they routinely overlook the Durand Line and the Pashtuistan Issue in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a preliminary step toward their ultimate aim of uniting all Muslim nations under the Caliphate, Islamist movements like the Taliban (in both Afghanistan and Pakistan) have established the Islamic Emirate. Members of Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South and North Waziristan call themselves the Power of the Islamic Emirate. Meanwhile, prominent TTP leaders have been making repeated statements about bringing Sharia law to the whole of Pakistan and overthrowing the current administration. A victory for the Taliban in Afghanistan would likely lead to a similar outcome in Pakistan. Even if some in Pakistani society are opposed to the Taliban and their aim of establishing an Islamic Emirate, the Taliban in Pakistan are well aware that they have many supporters. Among the Sunni population of Pakistan, there are political factions, orthodox congregations, and academic institutions that all lend their support to the idea of an Islamic Emirate and Caliphate. However, the Pakistani academic and foundation communities continue to hold a shockingly inaccurate view of the Pakistani Taliban, believing that Talibanization in Pakistan is intimately tied to the current struggle in Afghanistan. They continue to believe that assisting the Afghan Taliban is a good policy because of the threat they believe it poses to Pakistan. Supporting Islamists and undercutting moderate patriots in Afghanistan would have terrible consequences, with Pakistan bearing the brunt of these disasters. It wouldn't be surprising if, tomorrow, the Pakistani Taliban remained in Minar-e-Pakistan, imitating the Afghan Taliban, and deciding the fate of Pakistan's patriot leaders, given that the Afghan Taliban has warned that nationalism won't protect Afghan pioneers today and that President Hamid Karzai has been seen in public near Ariana Square, where President Najibullah's body was publicly hung in 1996. (Princeton University Press, 2012).

A Way Forward:

There has always been animosity between Pakistan and its neighbor, Afghanistan. The administration's ability to acknowledge the Durand line disagreement is the primary issue. The Afghan population, however, does not recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary. Nonetheless, trade and other activity between Afghanistan and Pakistan occur over this boundary. Afghanistan is a country home to a wide variety of cultural traditions. Since Pashtuns account for over 45% of the population and regularly engage in violent disputes with other ethnic groups, civilian peace cannot be implemented in this mountainous terrain. Ethnic declarations and peace negotiations are feasible in this Muslim state. Unfortunately, they still haven't adopted a Pakistani national identity. In Pakistan, they are held in such high esteem that people worry for them. A majority of Pashtuns want to form a new nation. One can talk at length about Pakistan's Pashtun people while breaking bread together. Relationships can be strengthened by mutual understanding and negotiation. In light of the looming deadline for addressing the Taliban's Durand Line other aims, Pakistan and Afghanistan must meet down together and express their mutual admiration. U.S. withdrawal terms and circumstances, negotiations with the Taliban, and other components of the Afghan peace process were discussed at the recent Doha meeting on September 12, 2020 in Qatar. Positive momentum in the peace process continues, and with international support, especially from the government of Pakistan, this process can be finalized.

CONCLUSION

Regardless, it's one thing to show that the Cold War was expensive; it's another to show that this was directly responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union. The 40-year program of military rule may be easier to justify if this happens. It doesn't make for interesting history, though. Despite its many errors, we believe that the Soviet Union was not only willing to bear the consequences of the Cold War, but had also largely hidden them. The sole event that matches this criterion is the Afghan War, which researchers of the end of the Cold War continue to overlook at their peril despite being one of the most intense yet unappreciated military battles of the 20th century. Previous research has found that only highly emotional and consequential events can trigger a domain collapse. Mistrust between two Muslim states can be resolved through bilateral cooperation if both governments can find common ground on issues like terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and peace talks with the Taliban. There is a Taliban government in Kabul at the moment, so it is crucial to negotiate with them if the two countries are to live in peace and prosperity.

REFERENCES


